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The 'Anti-Feminism' of Hannah Arendt*

Maria Markus

There is a disturbing tendency in contemporary feminist theory, which is often quite prepared to re-think, re-evaluate, re-interpret, or even simply learn from different theoretical propositions produced by males, but persistently ignores the existence of women thinkers unless they declare openly their interest in feminism. Otherwise their works are mostly considered as not worthy even of a serious critical examination, and the best they can hope for is a few dismissive remarks as they have 'next to nothing' to say on woman, or — if they do — it is all wrong, as it is supposed to serve only the purpose of 'sneaking into the men's club'. This problematic demand of 'loyalty' is on the one hand, dangerously self-limiting for feminist theory; and on the other hand, it is also inconsistent with the main body of this theory. For if being a woman is an experience of the importance ascribed to it (and I think justly so) by feminism, then it has to have an impact upon theoretical investigations produced by women, even if they are not related directly to feminist issues. Not to take them into account cannot but impoverish the perspectives and the 'ways of seeing' of feminist theory.

The relation towards Hannah Arendt's intellectual heritage is almost a paradigmatic case of such an attitude. While being taken seriously by philosophers in general and by political philosophers in particular. Arendt had been hitherto almost totally ignored by feminists. It is only very recently that some re-thinking of her work from feminist perspectives has been initiated, and it has already led to some interesting results introducing some new perspectives into feminist analyses and ongoing debates.¹

No doubt Arendt's ideas are often as stimulating as they are problematic; and perhaps even more so in respect to those issues and topics which have a direct relevance to feminist theory. The emphasis is, however, on stimulating as it means that they contain ideas and suggestions that cannot be simply ignored, that by ignoring them we are refusing to consider a series of propositions which are not only extremely relevant to 'human condition' in general and 'women's condition' in

particular, but which almost always have 'something to them', which show us new dimensions of, and often the possibility for, new solutions to the problems we are preoccupied with.

Christopher Lasch is quite right pointing out that "Arendt raised some of the most important questions that can be raised about modern history, (and) that (at the same time) she rejected easy answers".²

This is certainly a sufficient reason for feminist theory to engage itself with Arendt's thought. My aim in this paper is neither to praise Hannah Arendt nor to defend her. All I intend to do is to stimulate such an interest, and — by sketching some lines of her thought — to demonstrate that they retain their relevance for us.

It is not my intention to claim that the issues outlined here exhaust all that feminists may find interesting in her writings, nor do I attempt to provide a feminist re-interpretation of the topics introduced; I restrict my discussion to three particular issues: Arendt's views on the questions of 'difference' — so very topical in ongoing feminist debates; her concept of 'conscious pariah' as related to women; and finally, a few remarks about her relation to the so-called 'woman problem', and women's movement, which I will attempt to connect with Arendt's concept of solidarity. Although nowhere elaborated in detail, this concept returns persistently in her analyses, and it seems to me to be in a sense, one of the key ideas of her social-political theory. From the point of view of feminism, this concept seems to be much more telling and also more fruitful — both theoretically and practically — than the currently favoured 'sisterhood'.

Through the above analyses, I also hope to introduce — even if only a very sketchy — a portrait of Hannah Arendt, a philosopher, a rebel, and a woman.

I. 'What' we are and 'who' we are. Arendt's formulation of the problem of 'difference'.

In her well known letter to Gershom Scholem, written in relation to the ongoing debate on her book *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, and explaining her attitude toward her own Jewishness, Hannah Arendt writes: "The truth is I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, and I never even felt tempted in that direction. It would be like saying that I was a man and not a woman...that is, to deny indisputable data of my 'own life'. There is such a thing — she continues — as a basic gratitude for ... what has been *given* and was not, could not, be *made*, for things that are *physei* and not *nomos*."³

As she elaborates further on this topic in a number of other places, it becomes clear that it is not so much 'gratitude', and certainly nothing like 'pride', she is really speaking about here. Her attitude is more precisely one of *acceptance* of what is given to us, acceptance of our 'destiny',

which the world presents us with, as a part of our human condition of natality. Natality, its constant and universal character notwithstanding, has also a historical, geographical, or generally speaking, social dimension, and, in this sense, is accidental for those born into it. The specific characteristics resulting from these dimensions of natality, 'pluralise' us and define 'what' we are in a society, but they do not exhaust the human condition of plurality which refers also to the uniqueness of each personality.

'What' we are, creates a framework within which 'who' we are is formed and realised, but it never conditions us absolutely. "Plurality is the condition of human action" — says Arendt — because it means that "we are all the same, that is, human in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live"⁴. Without this condition, action would be not only meaningless but also impossible.

Society, however, not only defines the concrete dimensions, or content of 'What we are', it also *hierarchises* the so-constituted plurality accepting its certain representatives as its own 'members', and ascribing to others the status of the 'outsider' or even 'outcast' — the *pariah*. Such a hierarchisation prevents the members of this latter group (or groups) from 'acting out' fully their intrinsic possibilities and potentialities. For it is only in action that a person discloses her or his 'who' nature; it is only in action that we come to know ourselves, and are able to let ourselves to be known to others. And it is precisely this type of human activity — action, which can be performed (can go on) only in relation to others, that is, above all in public, from which the pariah is excluded.

To be sure, the characteristics given to us in 'What' we are, restrict us. The possibilities, however, which they open up and foreclose are not only historically and socially specific; we are not simply passively 'exposed' to them, but can relate to them in a number of ways. According to Arendt, this is so even in the case of a 'pariah'.

Firstly, we can accept 'exclusion' as a fate of a pariah without any particular resistance and remain thus 'invisible', and unable to influence the community we live in.

Secondly, we can attempt to assimilate, to deny, or to 'hide' 'What' we are, and to gain thus some more or less limited access to the community's matters. This is the attitude labelled by Arendt as that of a 'parvenu'. An attitude toward which she — perhaps not always quite justly — has only contempt or pity. *Pity*, because such a life-strategy must lead to a struggle against *oneself*: and — in consequence — to a continuous *denial of oneself*. "The possibilities of being different from what one is, are infinite — writes Arendt, describing Rahel Varnhagen's attempts at assimilation — Once one has negated oneself, however, there are no longer any particular choices. There is only one aim: always, at any given moment, to be different from what one is: never to assert oneself"⁵.

Contempt — because whoever denies ‘What’ she or he is, must also deny the *solidarity* with those to whom she or he really belongs. For it is solidarity, according to Arendt, and not love or other ‘personal’ emotion, which one owes to one’s own kind. Especially to the kind which is discriminated against, oppressed or excluded. This is an unwritten moral code for Arendt.

Solidarity never implies for her an uncritical acceptance or a total identification. Just the opposite, it presupposes an ability to be independent in one’s own judgements, to be *oneself*. For only by accepting in this way ‘What’ we are we learn ‘Who’ we are.

This leads Arendt to distinguishing yet another possibility, a third alternative in our relationship to what we are — the alternative of a ‘*conscious pariah*’. While the person who really wants to be assimilated cannot pick and choose among the elements to which she or he would be willing to assimilate, cannot decide what she or he likes and dislikes, the conscious pariah insists upon her/his rights to be not only ‘*What*’ but also ‘*Who*’ she or he is, and therefore is able to maintain an independence, a certain distance towards both communities — the one she belongs to by the very fact of natality and the one she lives in.

II. *Conscious Pariah. Two Paradigms: Rosa vs. Rahel*

The attitude of conscious pariah is the stance which Hannah Arendt herself chose and which she described telling the painful story of Rahel Varnhagen, or the tales of the life and work of Heinrich Heine, Sholom Aleihem, Franz Kafka, or Walter Benjamin, all of whom ‘affirmed their pariah status together with their right to a place in European culture, all of whom were and remained above all themselves’. Not less importantly, all of these persons rejected any attempt to be treated as exceptions; they were *themselves* and therefore *unique*, but every human being is a particular somebody and a unique someone. Rejecting their exceptional status they were also *rebels*, and being rebels they did more than just arrange their personal lives and make their personal choices — they provoked.

When Hannah Arendt herself was considering the rejection of the full professorship offered to her by Princeton University, it was because the University attempted to present her case as a case of an ‘exceptional woman’. Arendt, however, did not want to be treated as an exception, but as ‘*What*’ and ‘*Who*’ she was, that is a woman, a philosopher, a Jewess, etc.

Conscious pariah writes Arendt — “were those bold spirits who tried to make of the emancipation of Jews that which it really should have been — an admission of Jews as *Jews* to the rank of humanity, rather than a permit to ape the gentiles or an opportunity to play the parvenu”⁶.

It can be, of course, argued that such a stance of conscious pariah is an elitist proposition. After all, all the persons Arendt uses as subjects of her stories, *were* — in one way or another — ‘exceptional’. She, however, insisted that Rahel, for instance, found her place in the history of European humanity only because she remained after all a Jew and pariah, that is *remained what she really was*.

The bankruptcy of Rahel’s striving to ‘become one human being among others’ had multiple reasons. Partly it was grounded in the conditions of her epoch which already had established a discrepancy between “what men expected of women ‘in general’ and what women could give or wanted in their turn” — a gap that “virtually could not be closed”, partly, in her discovery that for a pariah, the entrance into society was possible only at the price of lying, of sacrificing every natural impulse, of concealing all truth, misusing all love⁸, and that she was not prepared, not able, to do because of *who* she was. She had finally to recognise that “if one wishes to be a normal person precisely like everybody else, there is scarcely any alternative to exchanging old prejudices for new ones”⁹. And it was only from this recognition that her courage emerged (she was not a courageous person), a *courage to return to herself*. Although she clearly felt that it was just ‘nothing’; this nothing was still a great deal for her in comparison with being ‘nothing more than her husband’, it still was *herself*. It was by this recognition that Rahel Varnhagen become a *rebel*.

To be a rebel and to be isolated were two characteristics common to almost all ‘conscious pariah’ described by Arendt. Neither was chosen as such but occurred as a consequence of a much more basic choice of remaining what one was. But there is among Arendt’s heroes a conscious pariah of a different sort — the type represented by Rosa Luxemburg. “She was an outsider not only because she was and remained a Polish Jew in a country (Germany) she disliked and party she came soon to despise, but also because she was a woman” — writes Arendt about Luxemburg.¹⁰ In this respect her situation was somewhat similar to that of Rahel. Not only were both of them cast as outsiders by being Jewesses and women, but, above all, both *claimed their right to be what they were*; even if in Rahel’s case it involved a long pre-history of hesitation. Despite the whole century that separated them from each other, despite the difference in social milieu, education, and personal qualities, there is a number of parallels between the two women, which connect them both to Hannah Arendt herself. They shared a ‘longing for happiness’, enjoyment of the ‘simple things’ — the ‘true realities’, like sun, trees, flowers, poetry or music. They also shared *loneliness*. But they were lonely in different ways. Rahel’s loneliness was connected with an extreme insecurity and vulnerability. She never aspired, and could not really aspire (within her own epoch) to become involved in public issues. All she really wanted

was to define herself, to affirm herself, to find out 'Who' she really was, through her purely personal relations, through her loves, through her friendships, through her literary salon. For the disclosure of who we are — though always demanding the presence of others — is possible not only in public sphere, 'out there', but also — though in different ways — in our most intimate relationships. Rosa Luxemburg was, however, a doer; she was a revolutionary, a leader and a theoretician of a mass-movement. She was a *rebel by choice*, from the very beginning. She also enjoyed a self-confidence often misjudged by others as arrogance and conceit (a character-trait Arendt shared with her). This self-confidence was based, in Luxemburg's case, on the one hand upon the "essentially simple experience of her childhood world in which mutual respect and unconditional trust, a universal humanity and a genuine, almost naive contempt for social and ethnic distinctions were taken for granted"¹¹, which was provided by her family; and on the other hand, upon the unique and quite extraordinary peer group around her, in her native Poland; a peer group for which the most characteristic quality was not so much the shared high moral principles, as — putting it in Arendt's words — a '*moral taste*'.¹² This peer group and its standards, which were 'uniquely their own' provided Luxemburg with strength and will to act and to endure not only her social position as a pariah but also the lack of recognition even in her own world of revolutionaries. "For it was precisely success — writes Arendt — which was withheld from Rosa Luxemburg in life, death, and after death"¹³. But it was not success or acknowledgement that Rosa Luxemburg was after. And yet, some, including her excellent biographer Nettl, not to speak of her 'quasi-peers' from the German Social Democratic Party, considered her overly ambitious. If she were not a woman, and so '*self-consciously a woman*' — notes Arendt — her ambitions would have been considered natural in a man with her gifts and opportunities. Luxemburg's life, however, demonstrates best that it was not ambition, not even a concern with herself which provided a springboard for her entry into political action. For "if she had been concerned with herself, she would have stayed out in Zurich after her dissertation and would have pursued her intellectual interests".¹⁴ Or having made the mistake of 'engaging herself in the socialist movement, she still could have lived quite comfortably in the pariah society of German socialists which' had 'created a miniature reflection of the German society at large'. Luxemburg's entry into the sphere of political activity was motivated, however, not by her concern with herself but by the fact that "she could not stand the injustice *within the world*"¹⁵. And when one is concerned in one's action with the world and not with oneself, one acts politically whatever the character of this action otherwise may be — emphasises Arendt¹⁶. Such action is not guided by pity or even compassion but by *solidarity*. Though solidarity

may be aroused by suffering, it is not guided by it. It can inspire and guide political action because "it partakes of reason, and hence of generality...(and therefore) is able to comprehend a multitude conceptually". "It is out of solidarity that they (humans) establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited"¹⁷.

This was Hannah Arendt's understanding of Luxemburg, and this was what she could easily identify with; in spite of the fact that her own passion was not action but rather thinking and understanding. She was not a doer, unless the circumstances provided no morally acceptable alternative. Her interest and concern, however, had always been *in and for the world*. And therefore, although the Rahel Varnhagen book is considered by many as an 'autobiographical biography' of Hannah Arendt, it was Rosa Luxemburg who was Arendt's real heroine, and not the much more passive, self-centred, and vulnerable Rahel.

It would be silly to deny the existence of fundamental historical and — above all — political differences between Luxemburg and Arendt. And yet, there are some basic issues on which Arendt is in a total agreement with Luxemburg, and also a wide range of questions in respect of which she does not share Luxemburg's views but justifies her choices and solutions within the specific situation.

Luxemburg's conviction that 'the organisation of revolutionary action can and must be learned in revolution itself', and that, therefore, the participatory spontaneous organs of the people are the most appropriate organs of government; that a 'deformed revolution' is much more dangerous than an unsuccessful one; her stress on the absolute necessity of not only individual but public freedom under all circumstances; her support for the idea of republic; and, above all, her courage to represent the most unorthodox standpoint whenever they expressed her genuine opinion and judgement, and whatever the consequences — all these were principles accepted by Arendt herself.

III. 'Women's Problem' and Women's Movement

The parallel between Rosa Luxemburg and Hannah Arendt extends to a degree into their understanding of the so-called 'women's problem' and its solution. In particular, it involves, their shared conviction that women's issues could not and should not be divorced from the larger range of political concerns, and the broader political struggle. It is not that either of them, and certainly not Arendt, expected these very real problems to be solved automatically as the result of other social-political transformations. They both, however, insisted that these issues should become part of explicitly political activity correlated and coordinated with the goals of other political groups.

Some indications of her understanding of what this problem really consists of were formulated by Arendt already in the early nineteen thirties, above all in her review of A. Ruhle-Gerstel's book: *The Contemporary Women's Problem*¹⁸ and in the already mentioned Rahel Varnhagen book.

It is this second formulation of the problem which I would like to recall here once again, as it is not only more original but also reflects quite clearly both the insights and the inconsistencies of Hannah Arendt's views.

Here Arendt emphasises that it is already in the early nineteenth century, the epoch of Varnhagen, that the 'woman problem' as "the discrepancy between *what men expected* of women 'in general' and *what women could give or wanted* in their turn, was...established". Putting it in other words, the 'woman problem' is defined here as a discrepancy between what women were or wanted to be and what men wanted them to be.

This formulation is clearly connected to Arendt's already discussed conviction that the 'sameness' of being human can be realised only through our being faithful to 'what' and 'who' we are, that is, only through the plurality of collective and individual identities. It obviously suggests that not only personal but also the collective identities are dynamic; that they are historically formed and *transformed*. It also implies that this transformation is not a process external to, and independent from us, but that instead we actively take part in it ("what women wanted"). By wanting or expecting something, we obviously refer somehow to our needs. From here it would be logical to conclude that the solution to the 'woman problem' could be brought about only through a *re-negotiation* of the needs and the collective identities of men and women connected to them in the process of which the women's movement would have an important role to play. Neither of these is, however, Arendt's own conclusion.

For one, she does not connect the collective identities with needs, at least not explicitly. Moreover, while not denying openly the changing nature of needs, she is inclined to treat them as 'given' rather than 'negotiable' characteristics. For that reason the needs are — according to her — not 'worthy to be talked about in public', that is they are non-political issues. In order to account for their undeniable appearance in the public sphere — one of the most characteristic features of modernity — Arendt introduces the concept of 'social', as distinct from political, issues which are for her not genuinely 'public'. By its 'quasi-public' character, the social not only blurred the important distinction between the political and the private, but also led to the atrophy of both of these spheres. Although Arendt herself is unable to sustain a consistent distinction between the 'social' and the 'political', and although she is

quite clear that this distinction has a historical character, she insists that it is possible to separate them as the 'things that are debatable and worthy of debate', and the ones "which we can figure out with certainty, and which therefore are not the proper subject for public talk".¹⁹ To be sure, this does not mean for her that these latter issues are irrelevant for society or even for the successful operation of the political. "While it is true — writes Arendt in *On Revolution* — that freedom can come only to those whose needs have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it will escape those who are bent upon living for their desires."²⁰ For the concern with the 'political' orients us towards the world and towards those with whom we share it, while it is ourselves, our own desires which we represent in our 'social' discourses.

This distinction between the 'social' and the 'political' is one of the reasons for Arendt's ambiguity concerning the women's movement. She considered a great part of the issues represented by the movement as basically social and not political, that is as issues concerned with liberating women economically and not with their freedom as citizens. Although the movement which Arendt knew was certainly closer to this description than its contemporary variants, this does not change the problematic character of the distinction itself. At the same time, as underlined by several authors, this is not a pointless distinction, although it clearly requires further elaboration and perhaps re-interpretation. It is perhaps possible, as suggested by Hanna Pitkin, "to conceptualise the public that recognises its roots in human need and its consequences for power, privilege, and suffering, without incurring the dangers Arendt fears".²¹ This may involve a reconceptualisation of 'needs' themselves. Nancy Fraser's paper in the present issue (and her other writings) pose the question precisely in such a perspective. By distinguishing different aspects (and levels) of 'needs-talk', by distinguishing above all the 'struggle over the interpretation of needs' from the institutionalised talk of experts, and the 'needs-definitions' provided by the different state-apparatuses, she both affirms Arendt's distinction and demonstrates the possibility (and reality) of the politisation of discourse about needs within the contemporary feminist and other social movements.

Arendt's ambiguity towards the women's movement, however, is not exhausted by this point. It is embedded much deeper in the whole of her social-political theory. She was concerned that the women's movement often promotes a form of emancipation which is similar to the assimilation of the parvenu, and which therefore is not a real emancipation at all. For to be really emancipated, women have to be emancipated as *women*; that is, not to accept the existing structures but to pluralise them and change them to a degree that suits their own identities. For "man and woman can be the same, namely human, only by being...different from each other".²² This is today perhaps an already

largely outdated concern, but it again demonstrates not only her insights but also the inconsistency of her treatment of 'needs' and the whole sphere of the 'social'.

Last but not least, there was a fear in Arendt that when women as a group enter the sphere of politics as concerned above all with their own 'women's problems', they will neither face up to the plurality of women's own opinion and judgements, nor the plurality of opinions confronting them. And this will necessary lead to a deformation of the movement itself and to a further destruction of the political sphere. Though not quite consistently with her commitment to the idea of participatory politics — which has to be a possibility open for all — she really would have preferred if it were not "the oppressed and degraded who led the way, but those who were not oppressed and not degraded but could not bear that others were."²³

This — according to her would ensure that the action is genuinely political because it is led by the *concern with the world* and not with one's own particular interests. Even if this is not quite consistent with her emphasis on participatory politics, it is again not a meaningless point. For what Arendt is saying here is that politics primarily is not about 'making claims' but first of all about learning what it means to 'share the world with others'. Of course, in order to induce change (and this is also a task of politics), claims have to be made. But it is precisely for the sake of maintaining this interest in others that Arendt would have preferred claims to be raised on behalf of others. It is not accidental that whenever she is evaluating positively the movements of sixties, she almost without exception refers to the actions undertaken in the name and for the sake of others.²⁴ This once again points to the centrality of the concept of 'solidarity' for Hannah Arendt's whole thinking. She contrasts this concept — sometimes equated by her with a non-intimate understanding of 'friendship' — with that of 'fraternity' or brotherhood. Promoted to the category of political sphere by the French Revolution, fraternity is considered by Arendt as the natural bond between pariahs, between those "repressed and persecuted, the exploited and humiliated"²⁵, but not between citizens. For being only a "psychological substitute...for the loss of the common, visible world"²⁶, it is for Arendt a category irrelevant to politics. Friendship or solidarity, on the other hand, "makes political demands and preserves reference to the world"²⁷, and thus constitutes a possible basis for an exchange of opinions about this world, and therefore for a political discourse and political action.

The question that Arendt does not address clearly is: how the *transition* from the status of a 'pariah' to that of a 'citizen' is to be made; and this certainly constitutes a primary problem facing contemporary feminism. Acknowledging this difference of perspectives, it would be, however, a mistake to ignore the ideas of Hannah Arendt as altogether

irrelevant to feminism, and to label Arendt herself as 'unconcerned' or even as an 'anti-feminist'.

The success of the feminist movement today depends largely upon its ability to generate social solidarity 'across boundaries'. For women's emancipation is not — as historical experiences have demonstrated — purely the question of an appropriate legislation, but depends above all upon the ability of the movement to establish a mutual understanding with the other half of humanity, and to renegotiate some of the most vital definitions and norms in order to truly universalise them. It depends upon its ability to generate support for the program of social change promoting liberation and recognition of the diverse human potentialities and ways of life, the renegotiation of value-hierarchies, and the constitution of new meanings.²⁸ And for such a program Hannah Arendt's ideas retain their relevance.

- * The first version of this paper was delivered to the Hannah Arendt Commemorative Interdisciplinary Conference, Sydney, University of New South Wales, November 7-8, 1985.
- 1. See e.g. M. Riot-Sarcey and E. Varikas' paper in *Praxis International*. vol. 5/4 1986; or Nancy Fraser's discussion on: "Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation", published in this issue of Thesis Eleven.
- 2. Christopher Lasch: Introduction to the special issue of *Salmagundi* on H. Arendt, No. 60, 183, p.v.
- 3. Hannah Arendt: *The Jew as Pariah*, Grove Press, N.Y. 1978, p.246.
- 4. Hannah Arendt: *The Human Condition*, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958, p.8.
- 5. Hannah Arendt: *Rahel Varnhagen. The Life of a Jewess*. East and West Library Publ. 1957, p.9 (*italics mine*).
- 6. Arendt, 1978, op.cit. p.68.
- 7. Arendt, 1957, op. cit. p.XIII.
- 8. See *ibid* p.169.
- 9. *Ibid* p.182.
- 10. Hannah Arendt: Rosa Luxemburg: 1871-1919: in *Men in Dark Times*, Penguin Books, 1973a, p.50.
- 11. *Ibid*. p.47.

12. I don't intend to enter here into a debate with the evaluation of Luxemburg's peer-group, which Arendt herself took partly from Nett and partly from her own family's tales. It undoubtedly was an extraordinary group, even if its 'moral taste' could not be maintained without qualification.
13. Arendt, 1973a, op. cit. p.40.
14. M. Hill ed.: *Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World*, St. Martin Press, N.Y. 1979, p.311.
15. Hill, op. cit. p.311; or see Arendt 1973a p.44.
16. Hill, p.311.
17. H. Arendt: *On Revolution*, Penguin Books 1979, p.88.
18. On the Ruhle-Gerstel's review see: E. Young-Bruehl: *Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World*, Yale U.P. 1984, pp. 96-97.
19. See e.g. Hill ed. Op. cit. pp. 315-320.
20. Hannah Arendt, 1979, op. cit. p. 139.
21. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin: "Justice: On Relating Private and Public", *Political Theory* vol. 9/3, 1981, p.343.
22. Hannah Arendt, 1973a, op. cit. p. 92.
23. Hannah Arendt: *Crises of the Republic*, Penguin Books 1973b, p.167.
24. See *ibid.* p.165.
25. Annah Arendt, 1973 a, p. 21.
26. *Ibid.* p. 24.
27. *Ibid.* p.33.
28. I have attempted to elaborate this point in some detail in: M. Markus: "Women, Success, and Civil Society: Submission to, or Subversion of, the Achievement Principle", *Praxis International* 1986 vol. 5/4; and in a paper delivered to an International Symposium on New Perspectives on Democracy and Civil Society, London February 21-22, 1986: "The Antinomies of Civil Society and the Feminist Movement" (manuscript).