

This article was downloaded by: [Moskow State Univ Bibliote]

On: 23 December 2013, At: 11:33

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



East European Politics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs21>

Democracy for export: the Europeanisation of electoral laws in the East European neighbourhood

Natalia Timuş^{a b}

^a Sciences Po , Middle East and Mediterranean Campus, Menton , France

^b Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University , The Netherlands

Published online: 24 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Natalia Timuş (2013) Democracy for export: the Europeanisation of electoral laws in the East European neighbourhood, East European Politics, 29:3, 289-304, DOI: [10.1080/21599165.2013.807803](https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2013.807803)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2013.807803>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Democracy for export: the Europeanisation of electoral laws in the East European neighbourhood

Natalia Timuş^{a,b*}

^a*Sciences Po, Middle East and Mediterranean Campus, Menton, France;* ^b*Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, The Netherlands*

(Received 30 May 2012; final version received 14 February 2013)

This paper argues that democracy promotion is not a “European Union (EU)-owned” policy and that the rule determinacy as well as the effective “anchoring” of democratic practices at the domestic level are a function of broader social structures and multiple actors at the European and domestic levels. The essay applies the international practices perspective on the relations of the European democracy promoters with the East European neighbours (EEN) and examines how the combined inter-institutional effort of the EU, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe affects the success of the pan-European democratic practices and policy instruments in the EEN electoral reforms. The analysis reveals that the domestic promotion of electoral reforms increases as a result of the common European democratic policy. Yet, when European institutions lack strong “sticks and carrots” and the EEN party systems are rather weak, the final Europeanisation outcomes depend on the domestic contextual factors.

Keywords: European neighbourhood policy; Europeanisation; elections; policy instruments; social structures; practices perspective

Introduction

Democracy promotion represents a central issue in the policies of European institutions, such as the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have been striving to encourage the spread of democratic values and standards, based on the practices of advanced European democracies. The largest share of literature on European democracy promotion has been devoted to the study of EU democratisation policies and particularly the case of EU accession. The driving reason is the argument that the EU’s political conditionality, enforced by a credible EU membership perspective, has outweighed the influence of other European institutions, such as the CoE or the OSCE, in the regional process of European integration (Schimmelfennig 2007). Also, the Europeanisation literature, interested in the impact of the process of European integration on domestic transformations, has revealed that the “carrots” of EU accession have been decisive in overcoming domestic factors responsible for the resistance of the EU democratisation policies (Börzel and Risse 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005).

The task of this article is, from the practices perspective, to examine a broader picture of the European democracy promotion by the EU, the CoE, and the OSCE in the case of the East European neighbours (EEN), specifically Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. As is argued, the

*Email: natalia.timus@sciences-po.org

strongest EU “carrot”, the EU’s membership perspective, is missing at the moment for these countries, although theoretically it is not ruled out, thus resulting in low credibility of EU membership.¹ This study contributes to the scholarly literature by applying the international practices approach, advanced in the introduction of this special issue, to assess whether in the case of a low credibility of membership perspective EU’s political conditionality continues to outweigh the influence of its European counterparts. It investigates when and how the domestic political actors engage in compliance with European requirements in the context of low European incentives. The analysis is based on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), particularly on the EU-country Action Plans (APs), which represent the legal framework of relations between the EU and its neighbours. The novelty of this research also derives from the study of the process of Europeanisation of electoral laws in the case of EEN and an investigation of the two major sets of structures that interplay in this process.

The study argues that the combined inter-institutional effort of the EU, the CoE and the OSCE increases the domestic promotion of electoral reforms. But because the EEN domestic actors are not as constrained as the EU candidates in adjusting to the European standards and the EEN party systems are weakly consolidated, the electoral reforms are botched by short-term strategies of maximising electoral benefit.

The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it focuses on the European inter-institutional structure promoting European electoral standards. This structure is understood as emerging from the cooperation of the main European democracy promoters: the EU, CoE and OSCE. The article identifies the specific European electoral practices and the policy instruments applied by the European institutions for their inculcation within the EEN. The study investigates major European electoral requirements towards the EEN and the extent to which they have been addressed and implemented by domestic agents during the period of APs.

Secondly, the domestic political structures are analysed in order to explore the origins and effects of domestic practices on electoral reforms, as well as to explicate the divergent outcomes of Europeanisation of electoral laws. The paper concludes with summative observations and specific recommendations on the practices of democracy promotion in the EEN.

Inter-institutional structure of democracy promotion and European electoral standards

Taking account of European democracy promotion in practice

One of the key limitations of European policies of democracy promotion, as compared to other policy fields, is the lack of clarity and specific guidelines regarding the process of domestic implementation of democratic reforms. Even in the case of the EU, where the volume of empirical and comparative studies verified the success of democratic conditionality vis-à-vis the aspiring member states, the political criteria suffer a series of limitations (Grabbe 2003; Tocci 2008; Pridham 2007). Given that democratic policies are not based on quantitative indicators, such as, for example, economic requirements, there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the measuring mechanisms and indicators of meeting the EU’s requirements in this field. Moreover, in the case of candidate states the major “test” regarding the compliance with the EU democratic conditionality is the screening process before the start of accession negotiations. Yet, this type of mechanism is missing in EU relations with the countries that do not have a membership perspective, such as those covered by the ENP. Despite the aforementioned limitations, research has shown that the presence of credible incentives, particularly the EU’s membership perspective, is a crucial factor in determining the success of EU’s democratic conditionality on domestic transformations (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Freyburg et al. 2009).

In addition, although the EU's political conditionality has evolved significantly since early 1990s, it is still largely relying on *democracy consolidation*, that is, the strengthening of democratic institutions (as envisaged by the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993) and less on addressing the primordial issues related to *democratic transition* (Pridham 2007, 449–450). For example, despite the fact that free and fair elections or political pluralism have been high on the list of EU's expectations towards its candidates or neighbouring countries, the EU's political conditionality is not specific enough with regard to the type of electoral reforms and the "rules of the game" in the electoral processes.

A common shortcoming of the existing research on European democracy promotion is the primary focus on the EU as the main democracy promoter and on the process of "EU-isation" (i.e. domestic transformations induced by EU accession requirements). As a result, important questions remain unanswered regarding the broader process of Europeanisation, understood as the domestic adaptation to European regional integration processes (Graziano and Vink 2006, 8) and the role of other European institutions, such as the CoE and the OSCE, in setting and promoting European democratic standards (Timuş 2010).

The present essay contributes to the existing literature by examining this major shortcoming and the relationship between the policies and instruments of EU's democracy promotion in the electoral field and those of the CoE and OSCE in the case of the EEN, from the framework of practices as outlined in the introduction to this issue. The study draws on three EEN: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. A distinctive feature of these countries, compared to other European neighbours, is that they have strongly declared their pro-European aspirations before the signing of APs and at present have the highest potential of a deeper cooperation with the EU and even of the EU membership. Thus, these EU outsiders represent control cases for investigating the EU's leverage on democratic changes in the presence of pro-European domestic aspirations but in the absence of EU membership perspective (Timuş 2010, 7).

This study explores a new field of European democracy promotion: the process of Europeanisation of electoral laws in the EEN by applying the framework of practices perspective on the relations of European democracy promoters (the EU, CoE, and OSCE) with the EEN (cf. Korosteleva, Natorski, and Simao (2013) in the introduction to this special issue). This framework highlights the importance of two crucial aspects of the concept of international practices. The first one is the performative aspect (action), related to the process of "doing" and the grounding skills required for this purpose. The second is the interpretative aspect, as individual practices become meaningful only when they are recognised as "competent performances" (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4) and follow some generalised standards or rules of procedure (Navari 2011). Based on this conceptualisation, the article aims to identify the patterns of European electoral practices and respective policy instruments as well as to ascertain whether these instruments are compatible with the European expectations and could trigger the emergence of new stable and effective social structures within the EEN. The analysis disentangles the domestic electoral practices before, during and after the period of APs in order to provide a comparative overview of the success of the Europeanisation of electoral laws.

The driving reason behind the selection of this research topic is the existence of an empirical puzzle that cannot be explained by the two European-level factors identified as being responsible for the success of the legislative compliance with EU's democratic conditionality. On the one hand, the EU's requirements for electoral systems and processes are vaguely defined within the national APs, being limited to general provisions on the democratic conduct of elections in accordance to the European standards² set by the CoE and the OSCE. On the other hand, although the EU also offers weaker incentives within the ENP framework than in the case of its candidate countries – the prospect of membership is currently lacking. Also, despite a preliminary observation revealing a number of electoral legislative changes during the APs implementation

period in each of the examined countries, as compared to earlier periods, these changes are not always followed by electoral practices complying with the European standards, limiting the scope of success of EU policies.

The research question this article addresses is *how the combined European inter-institutional effort of the EU, CoE and OSCE affects the success of diffusion of pan-European democratic practices and policy instruments, with the case study of the process of Europeanisation of electoral laws within the EEN*. The combined European inter-institutional effort is understood as the structural coordination and intersection of the three major European institutions in triggering domestic-level changes in line with the European democratic norms and practices in the EEN. The essay applies the international practices perspective on relations of the European democracy promoters with the EEN. A successful outcome of the Europeanisation of electoral laws would include not only the European rule adoption, but also the positive implementation of the European electoral standards and the development of the appropriate domestic practices.

The argument of this paper is two-fold. The combined inter-institutional effort of the EU, CoE and OSCE increases the rule determinacy and the “anchoring” of European democratic practices at the domestic level. However, when European institutions lack strong “sticks and carrots” and the EEN party systems are rather weak, the final Europeanisation outcomes depend on the domestic contextual factors. Domestic actors are willing to implement the European electoral standards for the sake of long-term EU membership prospective. But because they are not as constrained as the EU candidates in adjusting to European standards, the domestic electoral reforms are botched by their short-term strategies of maximising electoral benefit. The article uses a qualitative approach, particularly content analysis and comparative process-tracing to the evolution of a country’s electoral frameworks and an analysis of the European leverage on domestic reforms. This methodological blend is helpful in tracing a more accurate relationship between the European- and domestic-level factors, agents and processes. The primary focus of analysis is on the European-level documents in the electoral field and the domestic electoral laws during the period of domestic implementation of ENP APs (2005–2009).³

European electoral standards

The concept of European standards in the democratic field refers primarily to the principles of European electoral heritage, which represent the common standards of European electoral systems. The Venice Commission (VC), also known as “The European Commission for Democracy through Law,” holds the leading role in constitutional engineering of the CoE members.⁴ It has been providing electoral recommendations and taking part in drafting domestic electoral legislations in line with European electoral standards since the 1990s. This is usually done in close cooperation with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), OSCE’s body responsible for the “human” dimension of security policies and specialised in elections, human rights and the rule of law in a democratic society. The joint opinions, which represent reviews conducted and adopted together by the VC and OSCE/ODIHR experts, represent the common policy instrument in the electoral field. These recommendations are discussed during the plenary sessions of the VC, where both OSCE/ODIHR and the European Commission (EC) are taking part and have a say in their final adoption (Timuş 2010, 11–12).

Several instruments are used for promoting the European electoral heritage among the CoE members: expert comments and recommendations, studies, joint opinions as well as codes on good practices. Although these instruments have a high potential to trigger domestic reforms, by offering specific recommendations on the electoral legislation, their power is weakened because they represent “soft instruments” and there are no political or economic sanctions

applied by the VC or the CoE and OSCE/ODIHR in case of the failure to adopt the VC recommendations (Timuş 2010, 11–12).

The underlying principles of European electoral heritage have been compiled by the Council for Democratic Elections – the joint working group of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE and the VC – in 2002 and adopted through the “Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters (CGPEM)” (Venice Commission 2002). The “core” of these electoral standards is the European constitutional heritage, which represents the foundation of any genuinely democratic society and consists merely of international rules. It states that suffrage must be universal, equal, free, secret and direct and that elections must be held periodically (Venice Commission 2002, 13).

Compared to the EU political clauses within the APs, the CGPEM can be described as having a high degree of determinacy upon the requirements regarding European electoral standards. Apart from providing some guidelines for specific electoral issues, the CGPEM also highlights the general conditions for the implementation of the underlying principles of European electoral heritage. Some of the most important conditions that set the basis of a democratic society are the respect for fundamental human rights, above all the freedom of expression, assembly and association. Also, the Code requires that the electoral law must have a certain stability that would protect it against political manipulation (Venice Commission 2002, 25). As a consequence the document suggests that the electoral legislation, particularly that dealing with the electoral system, should not be changed within one year before elections and should not undergo often changes in general. With regard to party funding, the Code stipulates the condition of transparency in the field of party funding, both during the electoral campaigns and monitoring the financial status of elected representatives (Venice Commission 2002, 31–32).

Last, but not least, the application of the CGPEM electoral principles onto the post-communist democracies was further clarified in two region-specific Conventions,⁵ with the primary aim of synchronising and harmonising the national legislation with the European electoral standards.

Following Adler and Pouliot’s (2011) typology of relationships among particular sets of practices,⁶ we can conclude that there is a symbiosis of electoral practices, resulting in a “coherent whole” of the pan-European electoral standards, framed and promoted by the VC – the actor that possesses the grounding skills based upon its expertise in this field. As a consequence, the determinacy of EU’s electoral expectations is dependent on the norms that are beyond the EU itself. Instead of adopting a personalised policy regarding electoral reforms, the EU delegates the responsibility to the “experts” in the field, brought together within the VC framework. Thus, although a separate reading of APs electoral clauses seems underspecified, these clauses become specific enough when placed in the broader European context of democracy promotion.

The delegation of responsibility to the CoE and OSCE for setting and promoting electoral practices decreases the relevance of the EU as a democratising actor, specifically in the case of the lack of accession conditionality. Then again, the EU still possesses the power of enhancing the promotion of pan-European rules that are supervised and enforced by the CoE and OSCE. As the latter two democracy promoters are not able to offer politico-material incentives comparable to the prospect of full EU membership, the EU has a higher potential of stimulating domestic reforms within the aspiring EU members from the Eastern neighbourhood.

The Europeanisation of electoral laws in the EEN

Cross-referential European electoral requirements

The APs represent bilateral *procedural instruments* (Whitman 1997) within the ENP framework, aimed at institutionalising the relationships between the EU and its neighbours. However, their soft nature, combined with the limited legitimacy of the EU policy in the

neighbourhood, significantly decreases the EU's leverage in inducing domestic reforms according to its expectations.

A closer look at the ENP APs' content reveals a low degree of clarity of EU's requirements in the electoral field. The common feature of the three legal frameworks is a broad reference to the democratic conduct of elections in accordance with the European standards (section on "Political Dialogue"). The EU gives some specific examples of related democratic principles, such as pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect of minority rights, and non-discrimination on grounds of gender, and on political, religious or ethnic views. But there is no clarification of the direction in which domestic reforms have to take place in order to implement these rather than the general democratic principles in the electoral field. However, what the EU does stipulate within the APs is the need to comply with the European democratic standards of the CoE and OSCE. This can be interpreted as the EU's recognition of the latter two institutions as the "watch-dogs" of the European democratic principles and the re-direction of domestic political elites towards the specific recommendations of the CoE and OSCE in this field (Timuş 2010, 6).

Apart from the low degree of clarity of electoral requirements, the EU's approach under the ENP is characterised by the limited credibility of incentives available to enhance domestic transformations. While the strongest carrot – full membership – is missing from the APs, it is also neither entirely ruled out, nor is the possibility of moving higher regarding the level of cooperation/integration with its EEN partners depending on their readiness to share the EU's democratic values and principles (Commission of the European Communities 2005). So, even if the size and credibility of rewards coming from Brussels is lower than in the case of candidate countries, the EU still possesses the power of triggering domestic transformations in its neighbourhood (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2010).

These observations stress the importance of moving beyond the EU boundaries and examining the broader social structure of European institutions (the EU, CoE, and OSCE) in order to understand the patterns of European electoral practices and the policy of European democracy promotion.

In order to follow the evolution of the European-level influence on party related legislative adjustments it is important to clarify what were the European requirements before the signing of APs. Table 1 presents a summary of the major European requirements and the extent to which they have been addressed and implemented by domestic political elites between 2005 and 2009.

Comparing VC's and OSCE/ODIHR's joint opinions and expert recommendations on Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian party legislation,⁷ one can trace several common requirements with regard to the electoral legislation in force before the signing of country APs. As Table 1 shows the major European concerns were the appropriateness of electoral systems, which had to offer a large degree of political representation, politically inclusive and transparent Central Electoral Commission (CEC), as well as a unified voters' register. Party and campaign financing were other important aspects of European-level requirements, which stressed the need for public funding and specific party funding regulations, largely missing at that moment in the examined states. Apart from these common provisions one can distinguish also the context-specific salient issues. For example, in Georgia a major clause was the existence of genuine political pluralism and of a viable dialogue between the governing and opposition elites after the Rose Revolution (Venice Commission 2006b) which was stressed also in the provisions of the country's AP. In the Moldovan case, the lowering of electoral thresholds, the representation of ethnic and regional parties, as well as the clarification of confusion on administrative units (e.g. Transnistria) were the main country-specific demands (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2006a). The 2006 joint opinion on Ukraine highlighted the need to assess the appropriateness of a proportional representation (PR) system with a closed party list for a country as big and diverse

Table 1. European experts (VC and OSCE/ODIHR) demands and EEN legislative adjustments.

Country	European demands before APs	Major legislative changes	European (VC) recommendations
Georgia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Genuine-level political pluralism Government – opposition dialogue Politically inclusive and transparent CEC Permanent and updated voters' registry 	<p><i>Constitutional Amendments 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A mixed PR and majoritarian electoral system Lowering the number of MP seats From single- to multi-member district <p><i>Electoral Code Amendments 2007 and 2008</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> PR system Threshold lowered from 7 to 5% Lowered signature requirement for candidates More transparent and politically inclusive CEC 	<p><i>Constitutional Amendments 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appropriateness of mixed system, independent MPs Threshold decreased from 7% to 3–5% A politically inclusive and transparent CEC <p><i>Electoral Code Amendments 2007 and 2008</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Negotiations among political forces and civil society Bad structure, inconsistencies and ambiguities of Georgian electoral legislation Violation of stability of law before 2008 elections
Moldova	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lowering threshold 3–4% Single threshold parties and blocs National lists and representation of ethnic and regional parties Politically inclusive and transparent CEC Ambiguity regarding constituencies (Transnistria) 	<p><i>Electoral Code Amendments 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lowering single-party threshold from 6% to 4% and for blocs from 12% to 9% <p><i>Electoral Code Amendment 2006</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical changes: simplifying voting procedures <p><i>Law on Political Parties 2006</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulations of party registration and activity Lowering party registration requirements Increased threshold from 4% to 6% for parties Interdiction of electoral blocs Interdiction MPs with double citizenship ambiguity regarding constituencies 	<p><i>Electoral Code Amendments 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single threshold for parties and blocs Representation of ethnic, regional parties Politically inclusive and transparent CEC <p><i>Electoral Code Amendments 2006</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The same as for 2005 Amendments Lack of scientific and public debates, transparency The same as for 2005 Amendments <p><i>Electoral Code Amendments, Law on Parties 2008</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Single threshold (4%) for parties and blocs Representation of ethnic, regional parties Clarify CEC's duties and authority Violation of right to be elected (double citizenship) Centralised electronic voter register

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

Country	European demands before APs	Major legislative changes	European (VC) recommendations
Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriateness of PR system • Possibility for independent MPs • Politically inclusive and transparent CEC • Unique Electoral Code • Unified voter register 	<p><i>Amendments to Law on People's Deputies 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of 2004 Constitutional Amendments (PR system, no independent MPs, 3% threshold, etc.) • Improvement of polling stations, campaign, mobile ballot box, media coverage • Improvement of CEC composition regulations <p><i>Amendments to Law on People's Deputies 2007</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provisions on home voting • No voting rights for citizens entering Ukraine later than 26 September 2007 (five days before elections) 	<p><i>Amendments to Law on People's Deputies 2005</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriateness of PR electoral system • Possibility for independent MPs • More transparent and depoliticised CEC • Unique Electoral Code • A unified electronic national voter register <p><i>Amendments to Law on People's Deputies 2007</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discrimination and invasion of privacy • Disenfranchisement of voters travelling abroad

Note: Based on Venice Commission (2006b), Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR (2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009) and Vogel (2007).

as Ukraine and the issue of fighting political corruption (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2006b).

The analysis of domestic political structures is crucial for understanding the origins and effects of domestic practices on electoral reforms, as well as to explicate the divergent outcomes of the Europeanisation of electoral laws. The study examines domestic electoral practices and policies before, during and after the period of APs in order to provide a comparative overview of the success of the Europeanisation of electoral laws. With regard to domestic agents of interaction with the European institutional practices and structures, the work examines the “meaningful actors” of political structures who develop and “perform” the existing and emerging domestic practices (cf. Korosteleva, Natorski, and Simao (2013, 9), in the introduction to this special issue): the governing and opposition political forces. Last, but not least, it examines the domestic context-specific factors shaping the behaviour of political agents regarding the *adoption* and *practical implementation* of legislative changes in line with the European standards.

The main characteristics of EEN’s domestic political structures before the APs are their low degree of consolidation, with political parties frequently entering and leaving political space, and their openness to institutional and policy-making changes (Timuş 2009, 158–164). The launch of the new ENP policy instruments and the signing of APs coincided with some important EEN domestic transformations. The wave of electoral revolutions reached Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 and highlighted the deficiencies of the existing electoral systems.

The pro-European aspirations of the revolutionary forces shaped the direction of electoral reforms in line with the European recommendations of the VC (Timuş 2010, 18). Saakashvili and his governing elite amended the 2001 Electoral Code (between 2004 and 2006) and the Constitution of Georgia (2005). The most important amendment was the change of the electoral system into a mixed PR and majoritarian electoral system, resulting in the lowering of the number of parliamentary seats and the change from single- to multi-member districts.

In the Ukrainian case, electoral reforms had started before the Orange Revolution and the signing of the EU–Ukraine AP. The negotiated 2004 Constitutional Amendments between the Kuchma regime and the opposition forces gathered around Yushchenko entered into force only in December 2004, after the fraudulent presidential elections. The new Article 3, Chapter 15 of the Constitution, introduced a PR electoral formula, a single all national constituency, and a lower threshold from 4% to 3%.

Finally, although Moldova did not undergo an electoral revolution during the 2005 elections, the regional wave of democratic changes increased the pro-European rhetoric of opposition forces and their post-electoral pressure on the governing Communist Party (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCMR)) to be open to democratic reforms in line with European practices.⁸

Table 1 illustrates the major electoral changes and their relationship with the European requirements before, during and after the APs in each of the three countries.

It shows an increase in the amount of electoral legislative changes in line with the European requirements as suggested by VC recommendations, which were also acknowledged by the European experts evaluating the electoral reforms. This outcome, we argue, is linked to the merit of the increased EU leverage on EU neighbours, as compared to that of the CoE and OSCE. As the ruling EEN political elites officially declared European integration as their national objective shortly before the signing of APs, they have been more interested in adopting electoral laws that comply with the European requirements now in order to increase their chance of being granted an EU membership perspective as a reward for the successful implementation of APs.

The empirical findings highlight the readiness of pro-European governing elites to promote more fundamental and even radical changes in order to comply with the European requirements. The change of the electoral systems from majoritarian to a mixed system (Georgia 2005) and later

to a PR system (Georgia 2008) or radically straight to a pure PR system (Ukraine 2004) was aimed at ensuring a greater and more proportional political representation, in line with the VC guidelines.

Yet, the major problem in both cases, highlighted on numerous occasions by the European evaluators (Venice Commission 2006b; Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2006b, 2007, 2009) is the lack of analysis on the compatibility of these types of electoral systems with the context-specific factors, especially those related to structures and ensuing practices, as per the conceptual framework of this issue. In the Georgian case, they have advised officials to “carefully consider” the appropriateness of the components of the electoral system for assuring “an optimum relationship between genuine representation and stability of government”. Secondly, they pointed out the failure to adapt the old provisions of the electoral rules to the new electoral system amendments (Venice Commission 2006b). Another recommendation was the call for the negotiations regarding all elements of the electoral system among key political forces and consultation with the civil society to achieve a broad consensus on the direction of reforms (Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 2009).

In the Ukrainian case, the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR (2006b) called attention to the earlier opinions of European experts on the applicability of a PR rule to a country as big as Ukraine. The latter requested national authorities to give a personal evaluation on the practical implementation of the new electoral formula and its outcomes. They also highlighted the fact that the amended legislation needed further adaptation to the new PR system. Last, but not least, the national as well as the international experts have stressed the disadvantage of a closed party list in the current PR formula for fighting party corruption, as it allows influential businessmen to buy places in party lists as a result of bribery or generous financial contributions to party electoral campaigns (Spector et al. 2006, 53).

In the 2006 ENP Progress Report the EC mentioned that the “endemic corruption” was the major obstacle in Ukraine’s development. It also stated that despite the progress in revising the legislative framework according to OSCE recommendations following the 2004 elections (with reference to the Law on the Election of People’s Deputies from 2005), the Ukrainian leadership had still to overcome the shortcomings of legal stipulations regarding campaign financing. The ENP Progress Report on Ukraine and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-corruption Report from 2006 stated that, despite the achieved democratic progress in 2006 parliamentary elections, Ukrainian leadership had to launch some more specific measures in fighting party and campaign corruption. Particular attention was drawn to the need to control electoral campaign financing and the use of administrative resources (Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2006).

Explaining the outcomes of Europeanisation of electoral laws

The comparative assessment of electoral reforms in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia highlights several important features of domestic political structures that can be held accountable for the success of the Europeanisation of electoral laws.

Although the VC and OSCE/ODIHR expert recommendations are detailed and address all the changes in the electoral provisions, their weakness is the lack of guidelines on their domestic implementation and reliance on European practices of advanced democracies. The absence of the categorisation of the importance of multiple electoral reforms, as well as the lack of practical and country-specific steps towards their adoption and implementation, leave to the domestic governing elites the final choice of the appropriateness of European recommendations for their political structures. For example, the shift of Ukrainian and Georgian authorities from a majoritarian to a PR system was aimed at following earlier, rather general, European recommendations

regarding genuine political pluralism and more proportional political representation. When Georgia adopted a mixed system, it was largely criticised by the VC experts who, without making reference to any particular electoral system, advised the Georgian leadership to “carefully consider” its appropriateness for their country. The result was the change to the PR electoral system that is (theoretically) considered to generate the most proportional political representation, but fails to take into account the important context-specific factors, such as Georgia’s territorial division.

At the domestic level, these limitations of the European recommendations result in the freedom of domestic political elites to choose from the “European menu of practices”. This freedom of discretion opens a window of opportunity for the governing parties to adopt a rationalist behaviour that would maximise their gains, facilitated also by the low degree of consolidation of the EEN party systems (Timuş 2009). The strategic behaviour of governing elites emerges as a key domestic factor in explaining the outcomes of the adoption and implementation of electoral reforms.

A common strategy used by the EEN domestic political elites is the adoption and implementation of electoral changes in a relatively short period of time before the election periods.⁹ Although broadly speaking, most of the reforms have been following the previous VC recommendations and were aimed at improving the existing legislation, their adoption before the election rounds was violating the stability of law which was one of the main requirements of the VC CGPEM. For example, in Georgia’s case, which presented the greatest violation of the stability of law before its presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008, the 2008 ENP Progress Report offered a rather critical opinion on this issue. The EC stressed that early presidential elections were called for within the minimum notice allowed under the law (45 days), which did not offer the opportunity for a sufficient preparation of opposition parties. Overall, the EU report states that the Georgian government failed to sufficiently address the VC recommendations from 2004 and the political process is characterised by “an ineffective system of democratic checks and balances”, a strong presidency and a weak separation of institutional powers (Commission of the European Communities 2008c, 3).

In the Moldovan case, the ruling Communist Party adopted several electoral reforms in 2008 (Table 1), shortly before the 2009 parliamentary elections. A specificity of PCRM’s strategy was the provision regarding the implementation of more fundamental reforms, such as the introduction of public funding for political parties, only after the approaching elections. This strategy maximised the electoral benefits of the governing party while disfavoured the opposition forces.

Lastly, the AP’s implementation in Ukraine (2005–2008) coincided with the post-Orange Revolution period, when the European democracy promoters, particularly the EU, closely watched the domestic developments and a significant external pressure was put on the new governing elites for assuring the compliance with European democratic standards. The 2005 amendments to the Law on People’s Deputies introduced several important electoral changes in line with the earlier VC and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations (Table 1). The European experts have acknowledged the electoral progress made by the Ukrainian authorities in their country reports (OSCE/ODIHR 2006; Commission of the European Communities 2006a), describing the 2006 parliamentary elections being “largely” in line with Ukraine’s European commitments. However, a main criticism was the shortening of the deadline for electoral amendments. So, although originally the amendments from July 2005 enforced the stability of the legal framework by setting a 240-day deadline for legal changes prior to elections, this time period had been shortened on several occasions and was eventually deleted only one month before the 2006 elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 5–6). The violation of the stability of law delayed the setting up of the polling stations and caused excess of voters at some polling stations during the elections day (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 4). Similarly, the July 2007 amendments

were adopted only two months before the pre-term parliamentary elections.¹⁰ The short time period before the elections brought to the failure of challenging the constitutionality of these amendments, criticised for disenfranchising some voters and raising concerns over the invasion of voters' privacy (OSCE/ODIHR 2007a, 1).

Another strategy applied by the EEN domestic actors is the use of the parliamentary majority to maximise (future) electoral benefits of governing parties and disfavour the opposition forces. This is observed in the Moldovan and Georgian case, where the governing party (PCRM and respectively ENM¹¹) had the legislative majority and the president also belonged to this party. The situation is different in Ukraine, where the governing pro-Orange coalition partners, NU Our Ukraine and BYuT Tymoshenko's Bloc, followed personal cost–benefit calculations and failed to work together to promote European electoral reforms. This resulted in a chain of severe political crises and pre-term 2007 parliamentary elections, which represented a major obstacle for Ukraine's progress in complying with the European electoral practices, reflected in the lower degree of electoral changes during the AP period, compared to Moldova and Georgia.

The strategy of maximising electoral benefits through the use of parliamentary majority has led to different outcomes in Moldova and Georgia, depending on the type of interaction between the governing and opposition forces during the adoption of electoral reforms. The 2008 amendments introduced some positive modifications in areas not "harmful" for the electoral success of the governing PCRM (e.g. party registration requirements and the number of party members in Moldova's administrative-territorial units of the second level, state funding, etc.). The Communist leadership stressed that these changes prove in practice the desire to promote "advanced European standards" in Moldova (Volnitchi 2008). But, at the same time, the ruling party ignored some of the important recommendations on ensuring political pluralism and better political representation and even adopted regressive legislative changes. The new legal provisions reversed the 2005 amendments and increased again the legislative threshold for parties from 4% to 6%, interdicted electoral blocs, and entailed the application of public party funding provision only after the 2009 elections, all badly hitting the opposition forces (Grosu 2008). So, by holding the parliamentary majority, PCRM has largely neglected the opposition's criticism on fighting political pluralism and important earlier European recommendations on the need for public debate and transparency in the adoption of the new electoral provisions (Vogel 2007).

In Georgia, the type of interaction between the governing and opposition forces, as well as the context-specific factors (2007 and 2008 political crises) led to different outcomes than in Moldova. The EU and its European counterparts, the CoE and OSCE, have played an important role in urging the Georgian governing authorities to respect political pluralism and negotiate the electoral changes together with the opposition forces, particularly during the 2007 and 2008 political crises (Council of Europe 2007, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2008a, 2008b; Council of the European Union 2007, 2008; European Parliament 2007, 2008; OSCE/ODIHR 2007b, 2008). In the autumn of 2007, before the presidential and parliamentary elections, negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties resulted in the inclusion of opposition demands. Some of them favoured the opposition parties and a higher degree of political pluralism, such as the lowering of electoral threshold from 7% to 5% or the adoption of a systematised mechanism of state funding for parties that achieved 4% in the parliamentary elections and/or 3% in the local elections (Government of Georgia 2007). However, these provisions were adopted with the March 2008 amendments to the Electoral Code, less than two months before the parliamentary elections, their last-minute implementation disfavouring the opposition parties.

In the situation of the 2008 political crisis, the new amendments to the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of the Citizens were the result of the intensive dialogue between the ruling ENM and opposition parties. These were held within the framework of the Anti-Crisis

Council, created by president Saakashvili. The outcome comprised important amendments regarding party and campaign funding (Timuş 2010).

Nevertheless, despite the increase in the amount and the intensity of reforms in line with the European electoral standards, the Georgian governing elite has been criticised by the domestic and the European representatives for their behaviour of curbing political pluralism and limiting civil and political rights. In the 2009 Joint Opinion, the VC experts welcomed the effort of Georgian authorities to adopt a sound electoral framework in line with European practices, yet stressing that their successful implementation is largely dependent upon “the political will of state institutions and officials”. While acknowledging the adoption of a number of VC provisions, the European experts underlined the need for further improvement to fully meet European and international electoral practices, particularly with regard to the right to vote and candidacy in parliamentary and local elections. Another important remark concerned the bad structure, inconsistencies and ambiguities of the Georgian electoral legislation, which resulted in “uncertainties and varying interpretations among stakeholders, thus impeding effective implementation of the law” (Timuş 2010).

Summing up, the empirical findings of this study are in line with the existing literature that highlights the importance of investigating the domestic factors in understanding the process and the outcomes of the Europeanisation. (Haverland 2000; Radaelli 2000, 2003; Héritier and Knill 2001; Börzel 2005). Compared to the case of EU candidates, which was more constrained during their EU accession, the domestic actors from the EEN have more freedom of action when adjusting to European standards. In the context of weakly institutionalised EEN party systems, although willing to adapt to the European electoral standards for the sake of long-term benefits (EU membership), the governing elites are following short-term strategies of maximising electoral benefit. The botched domestic reforms and the emerging practices are the result of different paths of Europeanisation of electoral laws, chosen by the governing EEN elites, conditional on the strength of governing elites (e.g. parliamentary majority) and the type of interaction between the governing and opposition forces.

Conclusion

The present paper has revealed the benefits of adapting a broader perspective of practices regarding the EU’s democracy promotion policy within its Eastern neighbourhood. In order to understand the complex and dynamic process of the Europeanisation of electoral laws within the EEN, it is crucial to study the European- and domestic-level practices and structures.

The empirical analysis points to a number of important findings. The placement of EU electoral expectations within the broader European institutional context shows that the determinacy of EU requirements is dependent on the norms that are beyond the EU itself. These norms are defined and promoted by the “experts” in the field: the CoE and the OSCE/ODIHR, within the framework of the VC. The specific APs’ references to the CoE and OSCE/ODIHR electoral standards increase the determinacy of EU requirements, while the VC policy instruments provide more specific recommendations for domestic electoral reforms. Although this diminishes the relevance of the EU in promoting electoral reforms within the EEN, the European integration objective of the EEN domestic political elites determined a larger openness to the promotion of the pro-European reforms during APs with the hope of achieving a deeper EU cooperation or even a full EU membership perspective after a successful implementation of the APs’ provisions.

But even if the combined European inter-institutional effort increases the success of European democracy promotion, the final outcome of compliance with the European practices depends on domestic structures. The “soft” European policy instruments, the absence of clear implementation guidelines and the primary reliance on European practices of advanced democracies result in the

freedom of domestic elites to choose from the “European menu”. In the conditions when European institutions lack strong “stick and carrots” conditionality instruments and the EEN party systems are rather weakly consolidated, the adoption and implementation of electoral reforms in line with the European standards is shaped by the benefit-maximising strategic behaviour of governing elites, conditional on their political strength and the type of interaction between the government and opposition forces. This finding confirms once more the importance of analysing the role of domestic agents and contextual factors in understanding the success of the European democracy promotion policy, in line with the earlier research in this field and with other contributions of this special issue.

Notes

1. During the researched time-period these countries seemed to be the only EU outsiders that could be regarded as control cases for the presence and the strength of European influence on domestic transformations (Haverland 2006).
2. The APs refer in this respect to pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect of minority rights, non-discrimination on grounds of gender and on political, religious and ethnic views.
3. As the APs were signed for a period of three years in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, starting with 2005, and for six years in the case of Georgia, starting with 2006, for comparative reasons the period of analysis is limited for three years for all three countries.
4. All the three examined countries are members of the CoE.
5. The Conventions drafted for the Commonwealth of Independent States (Venice Commission 2006a) and by the Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO) (2002).
6. See the introductory article of this special issue for a more detailed explanation of this typology (Korosteleva, Natorski, and Simao 2013, 9).
7. Particularly Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009) and Vogel (2007).
8. The European integration objective acted as a unifying power of governing and opposition parties, leading to the adoption by Moldovan legislature of The Declaration on Political Partnership (March 2005) with the aim of promoting pro-European reforms (see more in Timuş 2009).
9. Ukrainian parliamentary elections from 2006 and 2007, Georgian presidential and parliamentary elections from 2008, Moldovan local elections from 2005 and parliamentary elections from 2009.
10. The pre-term elections from September were the result of the political crisis emerged in the spring of 2007 between the ruling coalition and the President, stemming from the lack of clarity in the constitutional prerogatives between the President and the government.
11. United National Movement.

Notes on contributor

Natalia Timuş is a lecturer at Sciences Po, Middle East and Mediterranean Campus, Menton, France and a researcher at Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, The Netherlands. She holds her PhD in Political Science from Central European University (CEU), Budapest (2009); her dissertation was written on “The Influence of European Integration Process on Party and Party System Development in the East European Neighborhood.” She has published several articles in international refereed journals (*Acta Politica*, *European Integration online Papers*, and *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*) on the topics of EU enlargement and external governance, as well as external democracy promotion and the Europeanisation process.

References

- Adler, E., and V. Pouliot. 2011. “International Practices: Introduction and Framework.” In *International Practices*, edited by E. Adler and V. Pouliot, 3–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 2006. *Istanbul Anti-corruption Action Plan for Ukraine. Monitoring Report*. Istanbul.
- Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials. 2002. *Convention on Election Standards, Electoral Rights and Freedoms*. Moscow.

- Börzel, T. A. 2005. "Europeanisation: How the European Union Interacts with Its Member States." In *The Member States of the European Union*, edited by S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne, 45–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Börzel, T. A., and T. Risse. 2003. "Conceptualising the Domestic Impact of Europe." In *The Politics of Europeanization*, edited by K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli, 55–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2005. *The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?* Accessed June 7, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm
- Commission of the European Communities. 2006a. *ENP Progress Report Ukraine*. Brussels, SEC(2006) 1505/2. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/sec06_1505-2_en.pdf
- Commission of the European Communities. 2006b. *ENP Progress Report Moldova*. Brussels, SEC(2006) 1506/2. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/sec06_1506-2_en.pdf
- Commission of the European Communities. 2008a. *ENP Progress Report Moldova*. Brussels, SEC(2008) 399. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08_399_en.pdf
- Commission of the European Communities. 2008b. *ENP Progress Report Ukraine*. Brussels, SEC(2008) 402. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08_402_en.pdf
- Commission of the European Communities. 2008c. *ENP Progress Report Georgia*. Brussels, SEC(2008) 393. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08_393_en.pdf
- Council of Europe. 2007. "Council of Europe Secretary General Terry Davis Reacts to the Situation in Georgia." *Press Release 753*. Strasbourg, November 8.
- Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. 2008a. "Procedural Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament." Strasbourg, January 23, 1601.
- Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. 2008b. "Observation of the Parliamentary Elections in Georgia (21 May 2008)." Strasbourg, June 23.
- Council of the European Union. 2007. "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Expresses Concern at the Situation in Georgia." Brussels, November 7, S317/07.
- Council of the European Union. 2008. "Council Conclusions on Georgia." Press release. Brussels, May 26 and 27.
- European Parliament. 2007. "Resolution on the Situation in Georgia." Brussels, November 29, P6_TA(2007)0572.
- European Parliament. 2008. "European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Georgia." Brussels, June 5, P6_TA(2008)0253.
- Freyburg, T., S. Lavenex, F. Schimmelfennig, T. Skripka, and A. Wetzel. 2009. "EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (6): 916–934.
- Government of Georgia. 2007. "Key Changes to the Election Code of Georgia Prior to the January 5 Presidential Elections." *Georgia Update*. Tbilisi.
- Grabbe, H. 2003. "Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process." In *The Politics of Europeanisation*, edited by K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli, 303–327. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Graziano, P., and M. P. Vink, eds. 2006. *Europeanisation: New Research Agendas*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Grosu, S. 2007. "Party Legislation: Quo Vadis and How?" *Democracy and Governing in Moldova* V (107), November 17–30. <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-journal/20071130/>
- Haverland, M. 2000. "National Adaptation to European Integration: The Importance of Institutional Veto Points." *Journal of Public Policy* 20 (1): 83–103.
- Haverland, M. 2006. "Methodology." In *Europeanisation: New Research Agendas*, edited by P. Graziano and M. P. Vink, 59–72. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Héritier, A., and C. Knill. 2001. "Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison." In *Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking*, edited by A. Héritier, K. Dieter, K. Christoph, L. Dirk, T. Michael and D. Anne-Cécile, 257–321. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kelley, J. G. 2004. "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions." *International Organization* 58 (3): 425–457.
- Korosteleva, E., M. Natorski, and L. Simao. 2013. "The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Practices, Instruments and Social Structures." *East European Politics* 29 (3): 257–272.
- Navari, C. 2011. "The Concept of Practice in the English School." *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (6): 611–630.

- OSCE/ODIHR. 2004. "Georgian Parliamentary Elections Demonstrate Continued Progress." *Press Release*. Tbilisi.
- OSCE/ODIHR. 2006. *Ukraine Parliamentary Elections 26 March 2006. Election Observation Mission Report*. Warsaw.
- OSCE/ODIHR. 2007a. *Ukraine Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections 30 September 2007. Election Observation Mission Report*. Warsaw.
- OSCE/ODIHR. 2007b. *Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections (5 January 2008). Needs Assessment Mission Report 20–21 November 2007*. Warsaw.
- OSCE/ODIHR. 2008. "OSCE Elections Chief Visits Georgia, Urging Inclusive and Transparent Preparations of Parliamentary Polls." Press release. Tbilisi, March 11.
- Pridham, G. 2007. "Change and Continuity in the European Union's Political Conditionality: Aims, Approach, and Priorities." *Democratization* 14 (3): 446–471.
- Radaelli, C. M. 2000. "Whither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change." *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 4 (8). <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>
- Radaelli, C. M. 2003. "The Europeanisation of Public Policy." In *The Politics of Europeanisation*, edited by K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli, 27–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schimmelfennig, F. 2007. "Europeanization Beyond Europe." *Living Reviews in European Governance* 2 (1), <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-1>
- Schimmelfennig, F., and H. Scholtz. 2008. "EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood." *European Union Politics* 9 (2): 187–215.
- Schimmelfennig, F., and H. Scholtz. 2010. "Legacies and Leverage. EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective." *Europe-Asia Studies* 62 (3): 443–460.
- Schimmelfennig, F., and U. Sedelmeier, eds. 2005. *The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Spector, B. I., S. Winbourne, J. O'Brien, and E. Rudenshiold. 2006. *Corruption Assessment: Ukraine. Final Report*. Washington DC: Management Systems International. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK247.pdf
- Timuş, N. 2009. *The Influence of European Integration on Party and Party System Development in East European Neighbourhood*. Budapest: Central European University.
- Timuş, N. 2010. "The Impact of European Democracy Promotion on Party Financing in the East European Neighbourhood." *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)* 14 (3). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2010_003a
- Venice Commission. 2002. *Code of Good Practices in Electoral Matters*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2002) 23. [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD\(2002\)023rev-e.aspx](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/CDL-AD(2002)023rev-e.aspx)
- Venice Commission. 2006a. *Convention on Standards of Democratic Election, Voting Rights and Freedoms in the Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States*. Strasbourg, CDL-EL-PV (2006) 004. http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/election_observation/docs/compendium_en.pdf
- Venice Commission. 2006b. *Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Georgia*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2006) 037. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/23487>
- Venice Commission. 2009. *Code of Good Practice in the Field of Political Parties*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2009) 002. http://www.astrid-online.it/~il-siste/Documenti/codicepartiti-e_2_.pdf
- Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. 2006a. *Joint Opinion on the Electoral Code of Moldova*. March 20. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2006) 001. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/18574>
- Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. 2006b. *Opinion on the Law on Elections of People's Deputies of Ukraine*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2006) 002. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/17947>
- Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. 2007. *Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Georgia*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2006) 037. [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD\(2006\)037-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2006)037-e)
- Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR. 2009. *Joint Opinion on the Election Code of Georgia (as Revised up to July 2008)*. Strasbourg, CDL-AD (2009) 001. [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD\(2009\)001-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2009)001-e)
- Vogel, H. 2007. *Comments on the Draft Law on Political Parties of Moldova*. CDL-AD (2007) 025. Strasbourg: Venice Commission. [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(2007\)013-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2007)013-e)
- Volnitchi, I. 2008. "New Law on Parties and Its Possible Consequences. Part 1 of 2." *Infotag*. Accessed January 10, 2009. <http://www.infotag.md/comments-en/538848/>
- Whitman, R. 1997. "The International Identity of the European Union: Instruments as Identity." In *Rethinking the European Union. Institutions, Interests and Identities*, edited by A. Landau and R. Whitman, 54–71. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.